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Abstract
This paper analyzes the factors affecting the speed at which newly
discovered oil and gas fields are developed. Using data from over 25,000
oil and gas assets globally I demonstrate that both asset and country
characteristics are critical in determining which assets reach production
stage. I analyze the effects of countries adopting a set of market oriented
reforms, to shed light on the impacts of institutional changes on petroleum
extraction timeline.
Mitigating climate change will require a large share of the world’s
already discovered fossil resources to stay underground. The results of
this study can help inform how petroleum producers may respond to the
energy transition underway. My findings also calls into question the as-
sumption used in earlier research that giant oil and gas discoveries can be
considered exogenous in their impacts on subsequent production.
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1 Introduction
When a country makes a major oil or gas discovery, policy makers and citizens
alike expect it to bring revenues and economic transformation soon. But the
reality is that petroleum finds can take over a decade to reach production, if
ever. For example, Uganda had a series of large oil discoveries starting in 2006.
The government and petroleum companies initially targeted oil production to
start in 2009. However, negotiations around taxes and pipeline routes stalled.
After repeated revisions of the timeline, the government now targets oil to first
start flowing in 2023. In Kazakhstan, the Kashagan field was discovered in 2000,
and though companies invested quickly, it took 13 years for them to developed
the field after technical set backs and disputes between participants.
Oil and gas projects require large financial investment and the execution of a
complex capital investment program. An industry-intelligence study reviewed
365 oil and gas mega-projects finds that 73% of the projects are reporting sched-
ule delays. Another industry study reports on how performance problems are
linked to systematic cost overruns reviewing a sample of 200 petroleum projects
(Rui et al., 2017). These delays have large financial implications not only for
companies but also governments expecting taxes from production. But despite
ample reporting on the topic in the industry and financial press, the factors
affecting the path from discovery to extraction have received scant attention in
the empirical research on the resource curse.
In this study, I provide systematic empirical evidence on the factors affecting
petroleum asset timelines. By looking at odds of production starting before and
after the adoption of a set of market oriented reforms, I provide some tentative
evidence that institutional weaknesses may cause slower timelines.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places this research in the broader
literature and highlights selected papers relying on an assumption that my paper
puts into question. Section 3 provides some context on petroleum project time-
lines for the benefit of those less familiar with the industry. Section 4 describes
the data I use in the analysis and some stylized facts on project timelines based
on summary statistic. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis results based on
various empirical strategies: survival analysis, discrete-time event history and
event study. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related economic literature
The relationship between economic growth and resource wealth has been subject
to extensive study and debate (for recent surveys see Ross (2015); Van der
Ploeg (2011)). An emerging consensus agrees that any overall resource curse
effect is best understood as mediated by the quality of institutions (Mehlum
et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). They argue that countries with strong
political institutions are better placed to reap the benefits of resource wealth,
in contrast, countries with weak institutions are more susceptible to the various
resource curse mechanisms.
One attribute these studies share is the examination of the relationship between
resource wealth’s contribution to the economy, typically measured via produc-
tion value, export dependence or government revenue windfalls, and economic
performance.
However, as pointed out by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), resource wealth
or dependence may be shaped by past economic performance, policy choices
and political institutions. For example, exploration efforts by investors, and
therefore the observed pattern of geological wealth, are themselves dependent
on institutional factors (Arezki et al., 2019; Cust and Harding, 2019). As a
consequence any correlations between resource dependence and economic per-
formance do not prove causality on their own - since there may be other factors
causing both the observed level of resources in a country, and its economic or
political fate.
Hence many recent studies have analyzed the impact of giant oil and gas discov-
eries instead of the level of petroleum wealth measured by reserves, production
or some other contemporaneous measure of its contribution to the economy.
For example, research by Arezki et al. (2016) examines the impacts on macroe-
conomic variables such as employment, savings, investment and the current
account, Cust and Mihalyi (2017) the short-term growth responses, Harding
et al. (2020) the impact on relative prices and real exchange rates, Abdelwa-
hed (2020) the impact on domestic taxation, der Ploeg et al. (2019) the trade
policy responses and Lei and Michaels (2014) studies armed conflicts following
giant discoveries. As argued by the authors of above studies, such discoveries
are largely unanticipated ‘lucky’ events where the within-country timing of in-
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dividual discoveries may be plausibly exogenous once we account for country
and year fixed effects. Countries have very little means to influence the timing
of such large discoveries.
Some of the studies above also implicitly or explicitly rely on the assumption
that all discoveries are equal in their likelihood and speed to reach production.
For example, Arezki et al. (2016), assumes that it takes an average 5 year for
a giant oil discovery to turn to production in calibrating their models to derive
expected economic impacts from the shock. Similarly both and Harding et al.
(2020), Abdelwahed (2020) and der Ploeg et al. (2019) explicitly rely on the
assumption that production starts five years after discovery, when interpreting
subsequent events as being caused by production. The latter study also includes
robustness checks for pre-production periods of 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 years, but the 5
year difference remains the central estimate.
The assumption of an average 5 year pre-production period is originally posited
and discussed in most detail in Arezki et al. (2016). It is supported by the
following four pieces of evidence. First, there is a graphical illustration of the
production profile including pre-production times from two Norwegian oil fields
(exact number of years is unclear but approx. 5 years). Second is an expert
estimate cited based on US drilling experience which reports an average of 4-
6 years between drilling and production.1. Third, Mike Horn, a geologist and
author of the giant discovery dataset is quoted suggesting it may take an average
of 7 years (no citation). Finally the authors’ report calculations based on a
subset of giant discoveries using data compiled by Global Energy Systems at
Uppsala University which contains both discovery and production dates. This
dataset consists of 157 giant fields discovered since 1970 where the average pre-
production time is of 5.4 years. But as explained by the authors of the dataset
in Ho¨o¨k et al. (2009), the ”Fields that have not yet reached their decline phase
(as of 2005) are excluded”. Therefore the dataset is truncated and the estimate
is likely to be downward biased given that it excludes fields that failed to reach
peak production in time.
The lack of production start date in the complete giant discovery dataset has
led to various workarounds. In their study of the impacts of giant discoveries on
conflict, Lei and Michaels (2014) try to establish the likely timing of production
1source: Why “Drill, Baby, Drill!” is Not a National Energy Policy by Thimothy D Kailing
http://www.ellipticalresearch.com/drillingandoilproduction.html
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start by looking at the time lag between giant discoveries and total country-level
oil output. They find an increase in production 2 years after discovery, which
then remains elevated from year 4 post-discovery on-wards. Though their study
attributes the increased oil output to the discovery reaching production, a study
by Gu¨ntner (2019) finds that this is partly driven by increase in production from
other oil fields.
Another relevant paper, by Smith (2015) using a different dataset constructed
by the author, looks at the impact of a country’s first oil discovery and its
subsequent impact on economic growth. Here the author warns of the possibility
that certain countries might be slower to get from discovery to production, but
ultimately discards this as a minor confounder with regards to long-term (up
to 30 years) economic impacts of oil finds. But his estimation also omits all the
countries, which had a first oil discovery but did not reach oil production by
the end of the time period reviewed. This may bias the estimated impact of
discoveries on GDP.
The studies discussed above all assume production automatically starts some
years (usually 5) after discovery, and attribute changes observed after that pe-
riod to petroleum production. While some studies explore the possibility that
there may be variance in the number of pre-production years, they do not sys-
tematically analyze and control for potential sources of variations in this respect.
This probably stems from the limited availability of field level data with both
discovery and production year. The sources cited to estimate discovery to pro-
duction time period suffer from limited geographical scope (US, Norway) or are
in fact a truncated sample of fields that have reached peak production within a
certain time frame. This research presents significantly different estimates from
a larger global dataset.
Some researchers analyzed the expected economic impacts of the projected on-
set of production at the level of a single country. For example Mozambique
discovered large amounts of gas in 2011. Toews and Vezina (2016) model the
expected FDI response and Melina and Xiong (2013) model the optimal invest-
ment path. These two studies assume production starts within 5 and 9 years
respectively. In reality the project is stalled, and latest estimates are now of
11 years. In contrast, Henstridge (2018) studies the costs associated with the
extended delays in the gas projects in Tanzania.
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While the latter study is a notable exception, country level research on the
expected impact of newly found resource wealth often devotes limited attention
as to when (if at all) an oil discovery will be turned to production. This research
provides more reliable estimates of the expected pre-production period based
on key country and asset level characteristics.
While exploration has been more concentrated in countries with stronger institu-
tions and more openness to trade, Arezki et al. (2019) also documents how there
is increased exploration activity across developing countries in recent decades.
On the other hand, climate researchers warn that in order to avoid catastrophic
climate change, a large share of already discovered oil and gas wealth has to
stay underground. For example, McGlade and Ekins (2015) calculates that one
third of current oil reserves and half of gas reserves must remain in the ground
to meet the 2C target. Similarly, IEA (2015) also forecasts that 50 per cent
of oil reserves and 40 per cent of gas reserves need to remain in the ground
to stay within the 2C target. Even under some of the slower energy transition
scenarios they forecast, many hydrocarbon assets already discovered are likely
to be stranded and remain underground.
What factors determine which country’s oil has higher likelihood of being de-
veloped? Previous analysis, such as Manley et al. (2017) looks at the number
of years it would take to deplete reserves based on past recovery rate, while
Mercure et al. (2018) and McGlade and Ekins (2015) looks at regional drilling
costs associated with extraction. Their analyses are focused on established pro-
ducers, where both costs and depletion rates are known. My research enables
to expand the analysis both in terms of global coverage and by looking at how
additional factors such as having state-owned company in charge of extraction,
having other assets in the country already producing or adopting market ori-
ented reforms may influence likelihood of project development.
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3 Context - The journey from discovery to pro-
duction
In this section, I provide a description of the steps involved in getting from
discovery to production as a background to the subsequent analysis.2
Around the world petroleum companies regularly acquire licenses or permit to
explore a certain area for oil and gas. Once they have obtained such rights,
they may conduct geological and geophysical surveys and carry out exploratory
drilling in promising locations. If they do not find anything for a number of
years, they are typically required to give up on these rights (relinquish their
license) so governments can bring in new companies to carry out exploration.
In case of a successful oil find, the company has the right keep the license and
develop the asset.
The life of an oil and gas asset, such as those in our database, starts an explo-
ration well strikes oil or gas, hence a new field is discovered. After an initial
discovery, the companies enter the appraisal phase, when further wells labelled
appraisal wells or delineation wells are drilled, with the motive of assessing
the size and viability of the initial find. Many successive wells may be drilled
depending on the results of drilling. The appraisal may take several years to
complete.
After appraisal, the next stage is the feasibility study. This is the phase in which
the initial concept for an oil and gas project is developed. The study identifies
the resources, how much (roughly) the project would cost, and where the money
to finance it would come from and what the returns may be on the project. If
more than one company is developing an oil or gas resource, companies set
out the basic structure of a joint venture, including the stakes each company
will have and which of them will be the operator, leading the consortium of
companies. In many countries, a local company or the state-owned oil gas
firm is required to be a joint venture participant. Such negotiations may be
protracted.
Next companies need to obtain all the necessary permits and file all required doc-
2This section draws heavily on Rystad database’s handbook and an industry
explainer from Oilprice.com https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Complete-
Guide-To-FIDs.html
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umentation related to the project, including environmental impact assessments
(EIAs) and route permits from authorities. The respective regulators have to
approve the project before companies can proceed with any actual construction
work. Contentious permitting issues may include the route of pipeline, water
use, gas flaring. Permit approval can get delayed or requests may be rejected,
requiring change of plans. The Front End Engineering and Design (FEED)
stage sets in details the technical and financial options reviewed in the feasi-
bility study. The FEED examines the technical requirements and provides an
estimate of the overall project costs and the costs of each phase, with support
from engineering contractors. For massive oil and gas projects, FEED contracts
typically take around a year to complete.
The next big milestone, which we also record in our database, is the approval. It
designates the when year the asset was approved/sanctioned for development.
This is the point in an energy project in which the company or companies
owning and/or operating the project approve—or sanction—the project’s future
development. This is often labelled Final Investment Decision (FID) in the
industry press. Typically, it is the board of directors of a company involved in
an oil and/or gas project who makes the Final Investment Decision for a project.
After approval, companies start developing the project, a phase labeled Engi-
neering, procurement, construction (EPC). In EPC, engineering includes basic
and detailed engineering, planning, construction engineering. Procurement in-
cludes procurement, purchasing, invoicing, logistics and transport. Construc-
tion includes civil engineering, electrical installation, and mechanical installa-
tion. Project development may see unexpected setbacks in any number of these
activities.
Finally, the project reaches its start-up, the third milestone recorded in the
database, when the petroleum recovery begins. This episode is often labelled
reaching first-oil or first-gas.
Once production started, production can be halted (labelled shut-in), though
this is rarely done due to associated costs. Once most of the oil is extracted
from an asset, and any further extraction is no longer commercially viable, then
wells are plugged and the asset is abandoned. I do not analyze the life of an
asset beyond when production starts.
8
The below graph provides a simple depiction of the stages I analyze using the
database. It also highlights that on average, the period from discovery to ap-
proval is longer than the period from approval to start.
discovery approval startup
9
4 Data description and stylized facts
I rely primarily on a large proprietary database by Rystad, an independent
energy research and business intelligence company providing data and related
consultancy services to the global energy industry. Their Ucube (Upstream)
Database consists of a complete asset-by-asset (field-by-field) database of the
world’s known oil and gas resources. Though their database includes petroleum
fields discovered as far back as 1900 and forecasts for future resources expected
to be found (by country) up to 2100, I limit my analysis to the over 25,000 assets
discovered between 1960 and 2019 based on the availability of complementary
datasets.
For each petroleum asset I retrieve its year of discovery, the year of approval
when the asset gets green light for development, and startup when the field
reaches production stage, where these stages were reached.3 A dummy records
fields that are yet to reach approval and production stages. I also calculate the
number of years the asset has spent without producing, using the year 2020 for
the assets that are yet to reach production. This variable takes the minimum
value of 0 when production started in same year as the discovery happened and
its maximum is 60 years for an asset discovered in 1960 that is yet to reach
production as of 2019.4
Table 1: Summary statistics for all discoveries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Producing 0.690 0.462 0 1 25823
Approved 0.699 0.459 0 1 25823
Start Disc Producing 7.377 8.931 0 60 17824
Appr Disc Producing 5.787 8.173 0 56 17824
Start Appr Producing 1.589 2.093 0 43 17824
Start Disc All 10.643 12.743 0 60 25823
Appr Disc All 9.512 12.666 0 60 25823
Start Appr All 1.608 2.177 0 56 18161
Table 1 provides summary statistics on all assets discovered between 1960 and
2019. First, I show the ratio of assets that reached its start up stage (Pro-
3For assets not yet granted approval or not yet producing, the Rystad database also pro-
vides some forecasts, but I ignore these.
4In the survival analysis set up presented below I add one to the year variable to avoid
having 0s which are not compatible with the specification.
ducing) and those that passed approval stage (Approval). It shows that 69
percent reached production, while marginally more 70 percent have been ap-
proved. Then I show the years between discovery and start up stage (Start-
disc-Producing), discovery and approval (Appr-Disc-Producing) and approval
and start up (Start-Appr-Producing) for all assets that have reached produc-
tion. It takes on average 7.4 years to get from discovery to production among
producing assets, of which 5.8 is getting from discovery to approval stage, and
another 1.6 from approval to startup. Finally, I show the values for the same
variable, but on the full sample but using 2019 for those that have not (yet)
started producing (Start-disc-All), (Appr-Disc-All), (Start-Appr-All). The av-
erage asset in the full sample has spent about 11 years not producing, and
almost 10 years not reaching approval stage. (For assets that are yet to reach
approval, (Start-Appr-All) does not exist, hence its average value is similar to
the producing only sample).
Table 2: Summary statistics for giant discoveries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Producing 0.704 0.457 0 1 1158
Approved 0.727 0.446 0 1 1158
Start Disc Producing 11.432 11.428 0 54 815
Appr Disc Producing 8.774 10.226 0 49 815
Start Appr Producing 2.658 2.826 0 39 815
Start Disc All 15.929 15.36 0 60 1158
Appr Disc All 14.007 15.331 0 60 1158
Start Appr All 2.637 2.828 0 39 844
I also provide the same descriptive statistics in Table 2 for the subset of assets
(fields) where the estimated volume of petroleum resource discovered exceeds
500 million barrels, the threshold used to denote giant discoveries. It shows
that only 70 percent of giants have reached production, a similar ratio to the
full sample. Most giant discoveries that reached approval stage have also started
production. The pre-production period is over 11 years across the giant discov-
eries that ultimately reached production stage and nearly 16 years when also
considering assets not yet producing. These values are well above the time-
lines presented on the full sample of discoveries. It takes 2.8 years to get from
approval to the start of production, considerably more than the 1.6 for all dis-
coveries, but still a relatively short period within the full timeline from discovery
to the start of production.
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These figures are relevant and present a stark contrast to the growing literature
presented in section 2 on the impacts of giant discoveries. 5 As opposed to the
5 year pre-production period average assumed in multiple studies, this dataset
suggests the period is mover 12 years for those that have reached production
and a third of the fields are yet to be developed. The large difference in averages
is most likely attributed to the fact that earlier studies used evidence of limited
geographical scope and truncated data by Ho¨o¨k et al. (2009) only looking at
fields which reached peak production within a certain period.
Table 3: Summary stats - all assets - regional breakdown
Region (World Bank classif.) Mean N
Prod. Appr. Start Disc P Appr Disc P Start Appr P
East Asia and Pacific 0.53 0.54 8.4 6.9 1.5 4,075
Europe and Central Asia 0.74 0.74 9.6 7.7 1.9 6,985
Latin America & Carib. 0.73 0.74 6.0 4.9 1.2 2,895
MENA 0.57 0.58 9.3 7.5 1.8 2,514
North America 0.84 0.84 4.3 3.0 1.4 6,713
South Asia 0.62 0.65 7.7 5.9 1.8 1,023
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.46 0.47 12.1 10.2 1.9 1,618
Total 0.69 0.70 7.4 5.8 1.6 25,823
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the regional breakdown of the ratio of as-
sets that started producing (Prod.), were approved (Appr.) the average year be-
tween discovery and production (StartDisc), discovery and approval (ApprDisc)
and approval and production(StartAppr) for the assets that have already started
producing, as well as the number of assets in each region (N). It shows that there
is large variation between regions, with assets in North America on average be-
ing developed more than twice as quickly as assets in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As shown in1 the data on the giant discoveries sub-sample also reveals stark
differences in pre-production periods in democracies and autocracies. Whereas
the mean years between discovery and production (or 2020 for non-producing
assets) is 11 years in fields discovered in democracies (polity score above 5 on
-10 to 10 scale), it is almost double or 21 years in autocracies (polity score below
-5 on -10 to 10 scale).
5The giant discovery sub-sample I present is not identical to Horn (2011). Though both
datasets measure this using the expected ultimate recovery (EUR) of the fields in barrels of
oil equivalent at time of discovery, they rely on different underlying data sources and probably
different geological assumptions used in calculations. For the comparable 1960 - 2010 period,
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Figure 1: Histogram of pre-production years of giant discoveries
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Note: The age of assets yet to start producing are counted until 2020.Sample: Countries with polity score above 5 (Democracy) & below -5 (Autocracy) at time of discovery.Only giant discoveries: assets of size above 500 MMBOE.
Given that the giant discovery sub-sample is much smaller, the remainder of
the analysis looks at the full sample of discoveries.
For each field, I also collect a range of geologically significant characteristic
from the Ucube database. These are the size of the field measured in the log of
the total barrel of oil and gas resources ((Asset-Sum-ln), the log of the water-
depth of the field ln-waterdepth), the ratio of oil vs gas found (OiltoSum and
GastoSum), whether the asset is shale or not (Shale-dummy), whether the field
is operated by a domestic state-owned company (OperatorGov).
I supplement the dataset with some country level characteristics. These are the
polity scores by Polity IV Project on the level of democracy (polity2) and the
log of the per-capita level of GDP (ln-gdp-pwt) from the Penn World Tables.
Another characteristic is whether the country is is already producing oil or
gas (pre-prod), as additional finds might be quicker to come online if certain
infrastructure are in place.
I also add the log of the nominal Brent oil price series from the World Bank com-
there are 756 giant discoveries in Horn (2011), while there are 1059 in Rystad’s Ucube dataset.
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modity data tables (lnOilPrice) and a year variable to capture any technological
progress.
For each asset, the time varying variables can be measured at time of discovery,
production start or any other year. See descriptive statistics with time varying
variables measured at discovery year in Table 4.
Finally, my main explanatory variable in my empirical estimations will be a
country’s turn towards market orientation or openness. For this I follow Arezki
et al. (2019) in using data on the timing of economic liberalization during the
years 1960–2004. This data was originally constructed by Sachs and Warner
(1995) and revised and extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2008), then further
extended by Arezki et al. (2019). Following Sachs and Warner (1995), the
following criteria are used to classify a country as open: (i) the average tariff rate
on imports is below 40%; (ii) non-tariff barriers cover less than 40% of imports;
(iii) the country is not a socialist economy (according to the definition of Kornai
(1992) ); (iv) the state does not hold a monopoly of the major exports; and (v)
the black market premium is below 20%. As a result they obtain a dichotomous
variable, where the country is deemed open in a given year if it satisfies all
of these above criteria. Else, if it does not meet either of these criteria, it is
characterized as closed. While this indicator was originally designed to capture
openness to trade, I follow Arezki et al. (2019) and Buera et al. (2011) by viewing
this indicator as a proxy for capturing the timing of a broader set of reforms
targeting economic openness and market orientation.
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Table 4: Description and summary statistics of additional variables
Variable Type Mean Std.Dev Description
Asset Sum ln float 2.733 1.864 Log value of the as-
set’s size in barrel of
oil equivalent EUR re-
sources
Gas to Sum float 0.464 0.391 Percentage gas resource
volume (vs oil) in total
asset resource volume
ln WaterDepth float 1.478 2.228 Log value of the asset’s
underwater depth (On-
shore is 0)
Shale dummy dummy 0.071 0.256 1: Shale asset; 0: Not
shale asset
Operator Gov dummy 0.318 0.466 1: If the company oper-
ating the field is state-
owned, 0: if not.
ln GDP discovery float 13.61 1.90 GDP of country at year
when asset was discov-
ered. (Source: PWT)
polity2 discovery double 4.314 7.225 Polity index of country
in year when asset was
discovered
Region WB cat. Regional variables
groups (WB)
Facility type cat. 1: Fixed 2: Floater 3:
Onshore 4: Subsea tie
back
Oil price discovery double 33.620 30.483 Oil price at year when
asset was discovered
Oil price startup double 41.068 32.234 Oil price at year when
asset started its produc-
tion.
Prod PreStart dummy 0.987 0.113 1: There are some al-
ready producing assets
in that country at start
of asset production; 0:
None
Open PreStart dummy 0.661 0.474 1: Country is open when
the asset started pro-
duction; 0: Country is
closed.
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimate on the likelihood of an asset not moving to
next stage after given number of years.
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5 Empirical strategy and analysis
I carry out econometric analyses regarding the factors that affect the speed
and likelihood of a petroleum asset being developed. I use various estimation
techniques, including a survival analysis, a discrete-time event-history analysis
and an event study. The approach extends on Khan et al. (2016) who analyzes
similar issue in the mining sector.
5.1 Survival analysis
Survival analysis is an empirical method used most frequently in epidemiology.
It allows to define a failure event, which in the case of epidemiology is often a
patient’s death, but in this instance it is when the oil asset starts production
(which one may consider labeling a success rather than a failure). The survival
function provides an estimate on the likelihood of an oil field remaining untapped
over the years after discovery.
Survivor function plots using Kaplan–Meier estimator
I employ the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator (Kaplan and Meier, 1958)
of the survivor function, which provides a simple way to evaluate the fraction of
observations, which have remained undeveloped after a number of years. A value
of close to 1 means that an average asset of certain age is almost certainly not
producing, while close to zero means almost certainly producing. The Kaplan-
Meier estimator allows to split the sample into groups and to control for certain
characteristics.
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I present the K-M estimates for the three different periods in Figure 2. First the
full period from discovery to the start of production, then followed by discovery
until approval and third is the approval to start up phase. The steepest - so
quickest and most likely among them - is going from approval to startup stage.
By way of example, I also show the K-M estimates for my main period of analy-
sis, from discovery to start of production comparing assets located in countries
with weak versus strong institutional scores. On the one hand one may spec-
ulate that weaker institutional settings have less ability to execute complex all
petroleum projects. Conversely, it is possible that consolidated autocracies are
better able to fast track important infrastructure projects by discarding local
resistance to the project.
The first plot shows that assets found in countries with lower polity scores at
time of discovery (below -5 on -10 to 10 range) are significantly slower to de-
velop than those with high scores (above 5 on -10 to 10 range). I also present
results which controls for certain geological characteristics taking the same val-
ues to more closely capture the differences associated with country character-
istics rather than geology. As shown in the second plot of Figure 3, there is
a large difference in timeline across institutional scores when comparing only
offshore giant oil fields discovered in the 90s. That difference increases even
further when comparing fields that are mostly gas. The difference between oil
and gas may be attributable to the fact that gas finds requires complex auxiliary
infrastructure (either to liquefy for transportation or converting it to electricity
or heating). The odds of offshore giant gas fields being developed within 20
years is about half when located in countries with weak institutions at time of
discovery rather than one with strong institutional score, see plot 3 of Figure
3. Altogether, the above evidence finds that countries with weaker institutions
are slower to execute petroleum projects.
17
Figure 3: Timeline from discovery to startup for assets in countries with low vs
high polity scores - with various controls
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Survival model- regressions
In order to evaluate the significance of individual variables on project timeline,
there are a number of regression types to consider. Within survival analysis set-
up, this can take the form a semi-parametric model, such as the Cox regression
or a parametric model, such as the Gompertz, Weibull, lognormal, exponential,
etc. I first present results from the cox model, which is followed by results from
multiple parametric models.
Key results from analysis
I first present results from a Cox regression of the following form.
hi(t) = h0i(t)exp(β1X1 + ...+ βkXk), (1)
where hi(t) is the hazard rate for asset i over time (t) following its discovery,
in other words the rate at which the asset reaches production and X1 - Xk are
series of explanatory variables.
Results are shown in Table 5. A first specification looks at a set of asset level
geological characteristics. It show that shale assets are quicker, while larger,
more deep water projects and those producing mostly gas rather than oil are
slower (result are of mixed sign and significance on this latter variable).
In a second specification I add country level variables shows that richer countries
and those with stronger institutions at the time of discovery are quicker. I also
show that when a government entity operates the field, it will be slower. (Most
of the variance on this variable is at the country level depending on how the
sector is regulated). Finally, I add time variables. The oil price at the time
of discovery is negatively associated with speed (which may be because asset
development decisions are based on future oil price expectations and not the
ones at discovery). On the other hand discoveries in later years are associated
with quicker timelines.
I replicate these tables for the two sub-periods I distinguish. Getting from
discovery to approval stage (specification 1-3 in Table 6) and then from approval
stage to startup (specification 4-6 in Table 6). Results are similar, though there
are some differences as well. For example, shale’s advantage seems to come from
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being quicker in getting from approval to start rather than from discovery to
approval.
Table 5: Results from Cox regressions
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Disc - Start Disc - Start Disc - Start
Shale dummy 2.548*** 1.558*** 1.191***
(0.0692) (0.0527) (0.0394)
Asset Sum ln 0.943*** 0.986*** 1.028***
(0.00387) (0.00492) (0.00465)
Gas to Sum 1.019 0.827*** 0.812***
(0.0190) (0.0184) (0.0173)
ln WaterDepth 0.919*** 0.882*** 0.870***
(0.00348) (0.00398) (0.00429)
Operator Gov 0.883***
(0.0189)
ln GDP discovery 1.088***
(0.00681)
ln Oilprice discovery 0.959***
(0.0143)
DiscoveryYear 1.006***
(0.00130)
polity2 discovery 1.013***
(0.00152)
Country FE No No Yes
Observations 25,823 17,831 25,823
seEform in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I also ran a number of different forms of parametric models, alongside the Cox
model on the timeline from discovery to startup. Results are presented in Table
8 of the Annex. Results are very similar across the 9 specification after taking
to account that specification 1-4 presents in Table 8 are results in terms of pro-
portional hazard (meaning a value above 1 is a quicker timeline), while models
5-9 in Table 8 are accelerated failure time models (where a value below 1 is a
quicker timeline).
Model selection and limitations
In order for the results from the semi-parametric cox model to hold, they need
to satisfy the so-called proportional-hazards assumption. That means that each
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Table 6: Results from Cox regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Disc-Appr Disc-Appr Disc-Appr Appr-Start Appr-Start Appr-Start
Shale dummy 2.139*** 1.346*** 0.970 2.994*** 2.214*** 2.786***
(0.0575) (0.0453) (0.0319) (0.0852) (0.0796) (0.0976)
Asset Sum ln 0.949*** 0.990** 1.028*** 0.959*** 0.974*** 0.985***
(0.00387) (0.00490) (0.00461) (0.00387) (0.00506) (0.00462)
Gas to Sum 1.040** 0.845*** 0.843*** 0.900*** 0.849*** 0.837***
(0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0186)
ln WaterDepth 0.929*** 0.893*** 0.886*** 0.950*** 0.933*** 0.918***
(0.00343) (0.00393) (0.00423) (0.00375) (0.00442) (0.00502)
Operator Gov 0.892*** 0.958**
(0.0188) (0.0203)
ln GDP discovery 1.087*** 1.020***
(0.00674) (0.00609)
ln Oilprice discovery 0.952*** 1.024
(0.0140) (0.0152)
DiscoveryYear 1.005*** 1.002*
(0.00127) (0.00127)
polity2 discovery 1.013*** 1.003
(0.00150) (0.00155)
Country FE: No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 25,823 17,831 25,823 18,161 13,271 18,161
seEform in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
covariate has a multiplicative effect in the hazards function that is constant over
time. This assumption does not hold for the time varying controls.(Results not
shown in this draft).
The various parametric functions I presented are more flexible in this regard,
they do not require such assumption to hold. But the parametric functions need
selection to ascertain best fit. This can be done using the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). As reported in the last row of Table 8 in the Annex, the
AIC test suggests that the best fitting model is the one relying on a gamma
distribution (column 9 which has the lowest AIC number).
This approach has shown that various geological, country-related and time-
related factors are associated with significant differences in production timeline.
Assets located in countries with higher institutional scores at time of discovery
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are quicker to be developed. I obtain quantitatively similar results using a
number of specification of survival models.
5.2 Discrete-time event-history
I also analyze the data using a discrete-time event-history model setup. In this
approach all years when the asset is not producing are considered a separate
observation with an additional observation for the year the asset starts up pro-
duction. I create a panel consisting of each asset across the years observed until
startup. A dummy variable codes for whether the asset started producing in a
given year or not yet (Start). Using the startup event as my dependent variable,
I run a random-effects panel regression model. This approach allows to include
time-varying explanatory variables for every year of the asset’s pre-production
life instead of having to pick a single year for each asset (e.g. the discovery year,
as done in the survival analysis).
I estimate the linear model using an asset-year panel regression presented in
Equation 2. I use robust standard errors clustered at the country-level for
experimental design reasons: the level of treatment (liberalization) is at the
country-year level, while observations are at asset-year level (Abadie et al.,
2017). In various specifications I include country-level fixed effects, year fixed
effects.
Startc,i,t = β0 + β1Openc,t−1 + β2age+ β3age
2 + β4Zc,i,t + αc + δt + ǫc,i,t (2)
where Starti,c,t represents a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if asset i in
country c is opening in year t. The main variable of interest is Opent−1,c,
taking a value of 1 if the country c opened up in the preceding year. I also
include an asset age variable age and age squared age2 variable to capture the
fact that the oil field has a decreasing likelihood of opening as years progress.
A series of control variables are denoted Z. αc denotes country time-invariant
characteristics, while δt captures common time varying effect.
I use this approach to test for the significance of including the adoption of
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market oriented reforms as an explanatory variable in a way that may include
assets that have spent some years in a closed economy and some years in an
open economy. This is the variable constructed by Wacziarg and Welch (2008)
described in the data section.
Key results from analysis
The results displayed in Table 7 show the effects of various variables on the
likelihood of an oil asset reaching start up stage in any given year. This model
set up uses an additional age variable (t) and age squared (tsq) variable to
capture the fact that the oil field has a decreasing likelihood of opening as
years progress. While the likelihood of opening drops sharply in the initial
years it later decelerates. Additional controls used in earlier regressions are also
included.
The new insight comes from the inclusion of a dummy variable on whether the
country is open or closed at any point in time (Open-state). I first run a logistic
panel regression with random effects (1). I then replicate the regression using
a linear panel model (2). This followes on (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) who
suggest that a linear model is more straightforward to analyze than a logistic
model especially when dealing with small changes in likelihoods. Specification
(3) adds year fixed effects and specification (4) also adds country fixed effects
to the regression.
The switch from closed to open is associated with a substantial increase in
chances of opening up in the first three specifications presented but disappear
when adding country fixed effects. The latter null result may be a result of not
having enough within-country variation in openness, as most countries do not
switch at all, and other countries once.
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Table 7: Results from discrete-time event-history model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
xtlogit xtreg xtreg xtreg
VARIABLES Start Start Start Start
t -0.0588*** 0.00557* 0.00382 0.00434
(0.00446) (0.00301) (0.00273) (0.00277)
tsq 0.000454*** -0.000120* -9.21e-05 -0.000108*
(0.000107) (7.14e-05) (6.09e-05) (6.09e-05)
Shale dummy 0.359*** 0.0911*** 0.0789*** 0.0281
(0.0380) (0.0312) (0.0265) (0.0495)
Asset Sum ln -0.0593*** -0.00923** -0.00804** -0.00149
(0.00572) (0.00378) (0.00376) (0.00467)
Gas to Sum -0.138*** -0.0306 -0.0263 -0.0268
(0.0259) (0.0248) (0.0223) (0.0264)
ln WaterDepth -0.128*** -0.0153*** -0.0143*** -0.0197***
(0.00575) (0.00318) (0.00286) (0.00271)
ln GDP PWT 0.169*** 0.0152** 0.0141* -0.00358
(0.00722) (0.00667) (0.00722) (0.00858)
polity2 -0.00273 -0.000403 -0.000297 0.000548
(0.00239) (0.00117) (0.00109) (0.000679)
Open state 0.462*** 0.0544*** 0.0548*** -0.00691
(0.0351) (0.0201) (0.0167) (0.0100)
Constant -4.286*** -0.0671 -0.145 0.208**
(0.111) (0.109) (0.132) (0.0929)
lnsig2u - Constant -3.542***
(0.897)
Observations 154,045 154,045 154,045 154,045
Number of assetid 16,111 16,111 16,111 16,111
Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes
Robust SE NA Yes Yes Yes
Cluster NA Country Country Country
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The association between country openness and increased likelihood of asset
startup is not necessarily causal. A third factor may both contribute to openness
and quicker timelines, but these initial results do show that assets are quicker
once such liberalization event took place.
5.3 Event study
The event study approach allows to estimate changes in likelihood of an asset
reaching production in the years surrounding a particular event. In this case, I
present results from analyzing likelihoods of production start in the years before
and after the opening up event. This followed on the earlier section. I use a
random effect panel model with robust standard errors clustered by country
and with year fixed effects alongside controls for asset characteristics (t, tsq,
Shale dummy, Asset Sum ln, Gas to Sum, ln WaterDepth) but not country
characteristics. On top of that, I add a dummy for all possible lags and leads to
the liberalization events. I use a limited sample of assets discovered at a time
when the country was closed (9,222 assets).
Key results from analysis
The results presented in Figure 4 provide a clear indication that there is a jump
in likelihood of assets turning to production in the years following a country
opens up.
The figure depicts how chances of an asset starting up varies in the 5 years
prior to and up to 10 years after a country opens up. The reference year used,
where the coefficient is manually set to zero, is the year prior to opening up
and the results presented for all other years are in comparison to this one.
While there are no strong trends in the 5 years prior to opening up, there is an
immediate jump in the year of liberalization which stays positive in the105 years
after, though its statistical significance is mixed (see bars showing 90 percent
confidence intervals).
The results appear immediately in the year of opening up and although fluctu-
ate, remain strong in the 10 year window after opening. This makes the results
even more visible when looking at cumulative impact over 10 years (bottom
plot). Having included year fixed effects should capture spurious correlations in
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case years with more liberalization events globally coincided with more project
start ups. The robust standard errors clustered at the country level should en-
sure that the results are not overly driven by very few liberalizing countries with
many assets.
I have presented evidence showing that a range of factors influence the speed at
which oil assets are being developed. Assets located in countries with stronger
institutions are developed quicker. Assets also experience an increased likelihood
once the country adopts major institutional reforms. This phenomenon can
be observed markedly across assets before such reforms: there is a jump in
likelihood of the asset opening up in the 10 years following such events.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I make two distinct contributions. First, I presented a detailed
analysis on the geological, institutional factors and time trends that influence
the speed at which petroleum assets are being developed globally. I provide
evidence on institutional reforms being followed by (though not necessarily di-
rectly causing) an increase in likelihood of oil field development. These results
may help inform analysis of future petroleum exploitation, which is especially
critical given the energy transition underway.
Secondly, my analysis calls into question some results from earlier economic
research using giant oil discoveries as exogenous shocks to a country’s subsequent
oil production and revenues. I find that oil discoveries on average take over
twice as long to be developed than earlier economic research typically assumed
and with large variation depending on institutional factors. As a result, this
earlier research underestimated the importance of pre-production impacts of oil
discoveries especially in countries with weaker institutions.
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Figure 4: Asset starting up before and after country opening
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7 Annex
Table 8: Results from various parametric regressions w AIC test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Cox exp gom wei logl llog logn ln ggammma
Shale dummy 1.271*** 1.233*** 1.264*** 1.225*** 0.846*** 0.846*** 0.801*** 0.801*** 0.814***
(0.0519) (0.0507) (0.0518) (0.0502) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0331)
DiscoveryYear 1.001 1.011*** 1.001 1.008*** 0.999 0.999 0.997** 0.997** 0.999
(0.00105) (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00103)
Asset Sum ln 0.998 1.003 0.999 1.001 1.015** 1.015** 1.013** 1.013** 1.027***
(0.00514) (0.00510) (0.00512) (0.00511) (0.00659) (0.00659) (0.00631) (0.00631) (0.00586)
Gas to Sum 0.876*** 0.886*** 0.877*** 0.884*** 1.293*** 1.293*** 1.274*** 1.274*** 1.284***
(0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0311)
ln WaterDepth 0.944*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.942*** 1.074*** 1.074*** 1.081*** 1.081*** 1.103***
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0172)
Prod PreStart 1.428*** 1.454*** 1.432*** 1.446*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.556***
(0.131) (0.134) (0.132) (0.133) (0.0557) (0.0557) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0479)
Facility: Floater 1.068 1.076 1.063 1.073 1.040 1.040 1.021 1.021 1.110
(0.0754) (0.0758) (0.0748) (0.0756) (0.0812) (0.0812) (0.0808) (0.0808) (0.0766)
Facility: Onshore 1.237*** 1.285*** 1.235*** 1.269*** 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.717*** 0.717*** 0.779***
(0.0811) (0.0846) (0.0809) (0.0835) (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0480)
Facilty: Subsea tie back 0.650*** 0.597*** 0.630*** 0.609*** 1.732*** 1.732*** 1.640*** 1.640*** 1.278***
(0.0335) (0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0313) (0.0962) (0.0962) (0.0896) (0.0896) (0.0611)
Operator Gov 0.940*** 0.937*** 0.938*** 0.939*** 1.094*** 1.094*** 1.089*** 1.089*** 1.083***
(0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0230)
PWT GDP discovery 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(2.51e-09) (2.51e-09) (2.51e-09) (2.52e-09) (2.77e-09) (2.77e-09) (2.76e-09) (2.76e-09) (2.43e-09)
Oil price discovery 0.998*** 0.999* 0.999 0.999** 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.000
(0.000503) (0.000502) (0.000501) (0.000502) (0.000574) (0.000574) (0.000560) (0.000560) (0.000474)
polity2 discovery 1.017*** 1.022*** 1.018*** 1.020*** 0.979*** 0.979*** 0.981*** 0.981*** 0.993***
(0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00164) (0.00164) (0.00149)
Constant 0*** 0.0165** 4.43e-09*** 255.9** 255.9** 6,051*** 6,051*** 54.09**
(0) (0.0339) (9.04e-09) (622.7) (622.7) (14,087) (14,087) (109.6)
AIC 51571.78 50209.17 51324.52 49522.54 49522.54 48946.71 48946.71 47829.56
Observations 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013 17,013
seEform in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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